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Jack Rakove's Rendition of Original
Meaning
RAOUL BERGER*
Resort to original meaning-the canon that a document is to be construed to
accomplish the draftsman's intention-in the process of interpretation reaches
back to English law of the thirteenth century.' Two of England's greatest
thinkers, Hobbes and Locke, demonstrated that the meaning attached by the
writer to his words is the essence of communication.2 Chief Justice Marshall
wrote that he could cite from the common law "the most complete evidence that
the intention is the most sacred rule of interpretation." 3 Without any mention
whatsoever of the precedents or of Locke and Hobbes in his Original Meanings,4
Jack Rakove labels resort to the original intention as the "ongoing quest for the
Holy Grail of original meaning,"' belief in a "correct" interpretation as "'a
necessary fiction for lawyers,"' 6 and asserts that "the notion that the Constitution
had some fixed and well-known meaning at the moment of its adoption dissolves
into a mirage."' His Stanford colleague, Thomas Grey, however, considers that
resort to original intention is a tradition "of great power and compelling
simplicity . . . deeply rooted in our history and in our shared principles of
political legitimacy [with] equally deep roots in our formal constitutional law."8
An impartial exposition of the ongoing debate called upon Rakove fairly to set
forth the originalist position instead of deriding it as a "mirage" and a "quest for
the Holy Grail," the more because, as Morton Horwitz observed, "[t]here is little
* Author, inter alia, of Impeachment, Executive Privilege, Government by Judiciary,
Death Penalties, and numerous articles.
1. Infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
2. See infra notes 26 and 27 and accompanying text.
3. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCuLLocH v. MARYLAND 167 (Gerald Gunther ed.,
1969) (emphasis in original).
4. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONsTrrtnON (1996).
5. Id. at 10.
6.Id.
7. Id at 6. But compare the legislative history of suffrage. See infra text accompanying
notes 111-15.
While he seeks to discredit his opponents, his evaluation of historical data raises grave
doubts about the trustworthiness of his own judgment. For example, Rakove couples Hamilton
and Madison "as leading framers," as "these two architects of the new federalism." RAKOVE,
supra note 4, at 16, 189. Hamilton left the Convention on June 30, visited it sporadically, and
returned for the signing in September. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT
PHImADELPHIA 115 (1966). At the Convention, Doctor William Johnson stated that Hamilton
"alone ... boldly and decisively contended for an abolition of the State Govts," the very
antithesis of federalism. I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 355 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS]. At the signing, he candidly said that "[n]o
man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his own were known to be... ." 2 id at 645-
46.
8. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705
(1975).
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
doubt that the debate over the Constitution has reached a new intensity and that
the discussion has vast implications .... 9
Rakove does not bring scholarly objectivity to this debate; thus he labels as
"political ... the work of recent conservative political theorists who prefer the
framers' ideas of natural rights and federalism to the result-oriented reasoning
of contemporary legal theory and its accompanying willingness to expand the
authority of the federal courts at the expense of the democratic autonomy of
communities and states."'" So, to prefer the Constitution and its central
federalism is political! I am a lifelong liberal who as long ago as 1942 declined
to make my predilections the test of constitutionality," a credo from which I have
never wavered. Contrast Rakove's readiness to scrap Article V, an explicit
provision of the Constitution, in order to achieve his social goals; he calls upon
us "to explain why morally sustainable claims of equality should be held captive
to the extraordinary obstacles of Article V" rather than "to rail against the evils
of politically unaccountable judges enlarging constitutional rights beyond the
ideas and purposes of their original adopters."' 2 He would jettison the text to
satisfy his social aspirations. His disdain for an express provision of the
text-Article V-tells us that we must not expect him to treat the extra-textual
"original meaning" seriously.
9. Ethan Bronner, S-t-r-e-t-c-h-i-n-g the Constitution, BOSTON GLOBE, May 8, 1988, at
A27.
10. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 5 (emphasis added).
11. Raoul Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 602 (1942).
Justice Frankfurter cautioned, "Nor should resentment against an injustice displace the
controlling history in judicial construction of the Constitution." United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 323 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
12. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 367-68 (emphasis added). His commitment to "claims of
equality," even at the cost of Article V, vitiates Rakove's disinterestedness, that hallmark of
scholarship. Learned Hand declared:
You cannot raise the standard against oppression, or leap into the breach to
relieve injustice, and still keep an open mind to every disconcerting fact, or an
open ear to the cold voice of doubt. I am satisfied that a scholar who tries to
combine these parts sells his birthright for a mess of pottage ....
LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 138 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960). "Disinterested
curiosity has been the great motive power of scientific research." J.W.N. SULLIVAN, THE
LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE 151 (1949).
Rakove's "rail," like his "quest for the Holy Grail," is calculated to discredit the opposition,
for "rail" is defined as use of "scornful, insolent or derisive language," 2 FUNK & WAGNALLS
NEw STANDARD DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2044 (1938), a style notably absent
from originalist writings.
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The Constitution is a legal document 3 to be construed by time-honored rules
of construction. 4 As Rakove notes, "[i]ts wording bore the mark of the numerous
attorneys present at Philadelphia, a group that included King, Ellsworth,
Hamilton, Wilson, Morris, Paterson, Dickinson, Randolph, and Rutledge," " to
whom may be added Martin and Madison. Although Madison was not a lawyer
in the sense that he had not practiced, he had studied law "for years."' 6 These
were the leaders, and presumably they were aware of the rules of construction. 7
Justice Story commented, "[a]re the rules of the common law to furnish the
proper guide, or is every court and department to give [the Constitution] any
interpretation it may please, according to its own arbitrary will?"'8 Consider the
companion canon to original meaning, the rule that employment of common law
terms implied, as Justice Story states, that the common law definitions "are
necessarily included, as much as if they stood in the text."' 9 This was the
common law rule, restated by Matthew Bacon's A New Abridgment of the Law:
"If a statute make use of a word the meaning of which is well known at the
common law, the word shall be understood in the same sense it was understood
at common law."' Hence Marshall declared that if a word was understood in a
certain sense "when the Constitution was framed... [t]he convention must have
13. Holmes insisted that "so long as the American alchemy converted great political issues
into questions of law their resolution must be found in legal rather than political reasoning."
MARK DEWOLFE HowE, JUSICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 56 (1963).
Rakove regards originalism as unpromising because of the Supreme Court's use of "law-office
history." RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 11. But abuse of a doctrine does not impeach its validity.
Rakove's opus drips with condescension towards legal history, a laughable attitude in light
of such giants as Frederic Maitland and Sir William Holdsworth. A divorce between historians'
and originalists' methodology should not hastily be assumed. Two eminent twentieth-century
British historians, Hugh Trevor Roper and G.R. Elton, were agreed that the essence of
"historical method" is to ground "detail upon evidence and generalization upon detail." Hugh
Trevor- Roper, Historian's Credo (reviewing G.R. ELTON, THE PRACTICE OF HISTORY (1967)),
SUNDAY TIMES (London), Oct. 15, 1967, at 33. Lawyers are taught to collect the facts and to
draw inferences therefrom that can withstand criticism.
14. Nobelist Steven Weinberg reportedly stated that some "complex phenomena, such as
turbulence, or economics, or life, require their own special laws and generalizations." JOHN
HORGAN, THE END OF SCIENCE 75 (Addison-Wesley ed., 1996).
15. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 342-43.
16. LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 80 (1995).
17. Much American law came out of Matthew Bacon's A New Abridgment of the Law.
MATrHEw BACON, A NEw ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW (Henry Gwyllim et al. eds., 5th English
ed. 1876) (1736); see infra text accompanying note 37. Justice Story stated that "Bacon's
Abridg[ment] title, Statute I. contains an excellent summary of the rules for construing
statutes." I JOSEPH STORY, LL.D., COMMENTARiES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 400 n.2 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873) (1833).
18. STORY, supra note 17, § 158 n.2. His contemporary, Chancellor James Kent, warned
against leaving courts "a dangerous discretion... to roam at large in the trackless field of their
own imaginations." 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 373 (9th ed. 1858).
19. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 160 (1820). For additional citations,
see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 195 n.5 (1977).
20. 9 BACON, supra note 17, at 244.
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used the word in that sense."2 How better secure the cherished "rights of
Englishmen"2' than by adhering to the words in which they were enshrined? As
Willard Hurst observed, "[i]f the idea of a document of superior legal authority
is to have meaning, terms which have a precise, history-filled content to those
who draft and adopt the document must be held to that precise meaning ... ,
for example, "habeas corpus," "ex post facto. '
ORIGINAL MEANING
"The rules of legal interpretation," wrote Hamilton, "are rules of common
sense... . ,2 Who better knows what the writer means than he himself? Certainly
not the reader. So Locke stated:
When a man speaks to another, it is... [to] make known his ideas to the
hearer. That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the speaker
.... [T]his is certain, their signification, in his use of them, is limited to his
ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else.26
Hobbes was of the same opinion,27 as was John Selden, the preeminent
seventeenth-century scholar: "a Man's Writing has but one true Sense, which is
that which the Author meant when he writ it."
29
The English courts were of the same mind, as a few examples will make clear.
(1) Chief Justice Frowicke, a fifteenth-century sage, recounted that in 1285 the
judges asked the "statute makers whether a warrantie with assettz shulde be a
barre, [and] they answered that it shulde. And so, in our dayes, have those that
21. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824).
22. RAKOvE, supra note 4, at 290-92.
23. Willard Hurst, The Role of History, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 75, 77
(Edmund Cahn ed., 1954). Paul Brest observed:
[S]uppose that the Constitution provided that some acts were to be performed
"biweekly." At the time of the framing of the Constitution, this meant only "once
every two weeks"; but modem dictionaries, bowing to pervasive misuse, now
report "twice a week" (i.e., semiweekly) as an acceptable definition. To construe
the provision now to mean "semiweekly" would certainly be a change of meaning
(and an improper one at that).
PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 146 n.38 (1975).
24. For citations, see RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 62 (1982).
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 559 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(emphasis in original).
26. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 204, 206 (Raymond
Wilburn ed., 1947) (1690).
27. Judges are to be guided by "the final causes, for which the law was made; the
knowledge of which final causes is in the legislator." THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 180
(Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell 1960) (1651). "For it is not the letter, but the
intendment, or meaning that is to say, the authentique interpretation of the law (which is the
sense of the legislator) in which the nature of the law consisteth." Id. at 211-12. The Framers
were familiar with Hobbes and Locke. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 100.
28. THE TABLE-TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 10 (S.W. Singer ed., 3d ed. 1860).
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were the penners [and] devisors of statutes bene the grettest lichte for expocision
of statutes." '29
(2) Lord Chancellor Hatton said, "when the intent is proved, that must be
followed... but whensoever there is a departure from the words to the intent,
that must be well proved that there is such meaning."3"
(3) In his commentary on Littleton, Coke stated, "words must be subject to the
intention, and not the intention to the words."'" And he stated in the Magdalen
College Case that "in Acts of Parliament which are to be construed according to
the intent and meaning of the makers of them, the original intent ... is to be
observed."32
Why does Rakove ignore the centuries-old English usage prior to adoption of
the Constitution? That usage represented wisdom accumulated over the centuries.
A wise judge, wrote Pocock, draws upon the "distilled knowledge of many
generations of men, each decision based on the experience of those who came
before and tested by the experience of those after, and it is wiser than any
individual ... can possibly be."33 Rakove himself cites Madison: "Where the
lessons of history 'are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. '34
He recognizes that "[m]eaning must be derived from usage";35 that American
"habits of thinking" were derived from English history.36 Nowhere was this more
true than in the realm of law. "[A] lot of American law," Julius Goebel
29. See A DISCOURSE UPON THE EXPOCISION & UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES 151-52
(Samuel E. Thome ed., 1942) [hereinafter A DISCOURSE].
30. CHRISTOPHER HATTON, A TREATISE CONCERNING STATUTES, OR ACTS OF PARLIAMENT:
AND THE EXPOSITION THEREOF 14-15 (London, Richard Tonson 1677).
3 1. 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND; OR
A COMMENTARY UPON LITrLETON 36a (Garland Pub. 1979) (1628).
32. 77 Eng. Rep. 1235, 1245 (K.B. 1615). Other cases and materials are discussed in
several of my articles, cited infra note 64.
In light of this English history, Rakove's attribution to Madison of authorship of original
intention "theory" is astonishing. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at xvi (describing Madison as "the
leading author of the theory of originalism"); see also id. at 342.
33. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 35 (reissue 1987). Pocock
expatiates:
Institutions which have survived... for a long time must be presumed to have
solved innumerably more problems than the men of the present age can imagine,
and experience indeed shows that the efforts of the living, even mustering their
best wisdom for the purpose, to alter such institutions in the way that seems best
to their own intelligence, have usually done more harm than good. The wisdom
which they embody has accumulated to such a degree that no reflecting individual
can in his lifetime come to the end of it, no matter how he calls philosophy and
theoretical reason to his aid.
Id at 36.
34. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 153 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 20, at 128 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
35.Id. at8.
36. Id at 194. The history of Parliament framed American constitutionalism. Id. at 205-09.
"Colonists naturally regarded their own legislative assemblies as miniatures of the mother
Parliament ..... Id. at 20.
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concluded, "came out of Bacon's and Viner's Abridgments.",17 English emphasis
on effectuation of the "original intention" was summarized by Bacon in 1736"8
and restated by Thomas Rutherforth in 1756,"' in a work "well-known to the
colonists."4 Rutherforth assimilated the interpretation of statutes to that of
contracts and wills and stated that "[t]he end, which interpretation aims at, is to
find out what was the intention of the writer."4 On the heels of the Convention,
Justice James Wilson, a leading architect of the Constitution, stated, "[t]he first
and governing maxim in the interpretation of a statute is, to discover the meaning
of those, who made it."42
This reflected the ethos of the people. Jefferson Powell recounts that the
English Puritans' suspicion of judges travelled to America. They feared that
judges would "undermine the legislative prerogatives of the people's
representatives by engaging in the corruptive process of interpreting legislative
texts";43 that the "advantages of a known and written law would be lost if the
law's meaning could be twisted by means of judicial construction";44 and they
opposed the "judges' imposition of their personal views."4 Anti-Federalists
regarded the national judiciary with "intense suspicions."46 Moreover, the
Founders had a "profound fear" ofjudicial discretion;47 all of which found their
way into "Brutus's" acute Anti-Federalist analysis of the judiciary article." Anti-
Federalist attitudes, Rakove notes, "were deeply rooted in American political
culture,. 49 and their "fears were part of the original understanding of the
Constitution,"5 " so that Hamilton was constrained to assure the ratifiers that of
the three branches, the judiciary was "next to nothing."'" As late as 1791, Justice
Wilson called on Americans to discard their "aversion and distrust" of judges. 2
37. Julius Goebel, Ex Parte Clio, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 450, 455 (1954); see also Exparte
Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108 (1925) ("The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted
safely except by reference to the common law .....
38. 7 BACON, supra note 17, at 457-58.
39. 2 T. RUTiiERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 307, 309 (Philadelphia, Whitehall
1799) (1756).
40. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12
(1975).
41. 2 RUTHERFORTH, supra note 39, at 302.
42. JAMES WILSON, Of the Study of Law in the United States, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 69, 75 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
43. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885, 892 (1985).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 891.
46. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 148.
47. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 298
(1969).
48. RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 85-87 (1969).
49. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 149.
50. Id. at 17.
51. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 532 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
52. JAMES WILSON, Of Government, in I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 42, at
284, 292-93.
[Vol. 72:619
ORIGINAL MEANING
Plainly the people were not as ready as Rakove to hand over their destiny to
judges.
Rakove, however, prefers "an influential article" published in 1985 by
Jefferson Powell, then but three years out of law school. Powell acknowledges
that "[t]he central concept-the goal-of common law interpretation was indeed
what the common lawyers called 'intention,"' and that they "often sounded
remarkably like contemporary intentionalists." "There is no disagreement," he
writes, "over the proposition that the common lawyers, and most of the founders,
thought that interpretation ought to subserve a document's [that is, the
draftsmen's] 'intent' .... The debate instead is over what 'intent' is meant."
There had been no debate as to the meaning of intent prior to his confessedly
"curious" theory that "'intention' was an attribute or concept attached primarily
to the document itself, and not elsewhere," 3 that "the basic notion of 'intent' [is]
a product of the interpretive process rather than something locked into the text
by its author."54 Thus, despite the common lawyers' constant differentiation
between the lawmaker's "intention" and his words, the common lawyers,
according to Powell, excluded the actual intention and sought it only in the
words,55 resembling a dog chasing its tail. Lord Chancellor Hatton's demand for
proof of "a departure from the words to the intent"'56 precludes a return to the
words in search of the intent. Samuel Thorne, a noted scholar in the field,
concluded that "[a]ctual intent.., is controlling from Hengham's day to that of
Lord Nottingham (1678)."5
Powell's stellar exhibit to the contrary is Hamilton's 1791 statement during the
controversy over the constitutionality of a national bank. Since the Framers, by
a vote of eight to three, had rejected a proposal to empower Congress to create
corporations, Hamilton was driven to argue that "whatever may have been the
intention . . . is to be sought for in the instrument itself."58 This was bare
assertion, unsupported by a single citation, and in derogation of the Framers'
unmistakable will. Hamilton, moreover, was not one to stick in the bark of his
own opinion if it no longer suited the occasion. Writing as Pacificus in 1793, he
53. H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1513, 1533, 1534, 1538 (1987) (emphasis added).
54. Powell, supra note 43, at 899.
55. But Powell pulls back: "[E]xisting rules of statutory construction permitted looking
beyond the text for 'reasonable evidence' of its meaning, though again this ordinarily meant
attempting to 'read acts of Parliament against the background of the common law."' RAKOVE,
supra note 4, at 352 (emphasis added). "Beyond the text" contradicts his assertion that
interpretation was confined to the text.
56. HATTON, supra note 30 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
57. A DiscouRSE, supra note 29, at 60 n.126.
58. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank,
in 8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 111 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1965). In 1791
Hamilton pretended to find the facts confused. Id But see infra text accompanying notes 90-93
for the facts of the bank debate.
1997]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
asked "how the treaty power 'was understood by the Convention, in framing it,
and by the people in adopting it."' 59
Powell's unpracticed hand is betrayed by his other two citations: the first, an
eighteenth-century contract treatise, stated that "[t]he law of contracts is not
concerned with anyone's 'internal sentiments. '" '60 There, one party claimed after
the fact that he had understood the terms in a special sense which, however, he
had not disclosed. This was truly an undisclosed "internal sentiment," so he was
held to use the words according to their common acceptation. Powell's second
citation is of similar tenor. Chief Justice Fleming said in 1611 that the "intention
and construction of words shall be taken according to the vulgar and usual
sense"; Powell adds his own gloss: "not according to any particular meaning the
parties may have intended."' Fleming referred to the sale of eighteen barrels of
ale which, according to "common usage," did not include the barrels. Since there
was no proof of intent to depart from common usage, Fleming stated "the intent
of the parties never was that the parties should have the barrels, but only the
ale. 62
That Powell was driven to dredge up such inapposite citations testifies to the
hollowness of his case against original intention. As Justice Harlan observed,
"the transparent failure of attempts to cast doubt on the original understanding
is simply further evidence of the force of the historical record., 63 All this and
more was spread before Rakove in my refutation of Powell.64 One would expect
59. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 357 (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Defence, in 10
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 58, at 22). Another example of Hamilton's
change of position: he had once stated that Senate approval was necessary for removal of an
appointed official. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). When William Smith cited this passage, he was shocked to learn that Hamilton had
changed his mind--4he President alone should have this power. Smith significantly added: "He
is a Candidate for the office of Secretary of Finance!" RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 350 (quoting
William Smith, Smith to Rutledge, 8 S.C. HIST. MAG. 69, 70 (1968)).
60. Powell, supra note 43, at 895 (quoting 1 JOHN JOSEPH POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS 373 (London 1790)).
61. Id. at 894 (quoting Hewet v. Painter, 80 Eng. Rep. 864, 865 (K.B. 1611)).
62. Id.
63. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 200 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The French
savant, Raymond Aron, wrote that a proposition "justifies itself by the falseness of the beliefs
that oppose it." Raymond Aron, Pensdes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1983, at E19. In the First
Congress Fisher Ames said, "nearly as good conclusions may be drawn from the refutations of
an argument as from any other proof. For it is well said, that destructio unius est generatio
alterius." I ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 539 (Joseph Gales ed., 2d ed. 1834)
[hereinafter ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS].
64. Raoul Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
296 (1986); Raoul Berger, The Founders' Views-According to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L.
REv. 1033 (1989); see also Raoul Berger, Original Intent: The Rage of Hans Baade, 71 N.C.
L. REv. 1151 (1993).
Powell acknowledges that "it is natural, inevitable, and appropriate that we should look to
the founders for enlightenment." H. Jefferson Powell, How Does the Constitution Structure
Government? The Founders' Views, in A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT? THE CONSTITUTION
AFTER 200 YEARS 13, 15 (Burke Marshall ed., 1987).
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that Rakove, who prides himself on the special virtues of historians, would have
weighed Powell's novel, confessedly "curious" theory in light of my criticism.
That is standard scientific practice. When a scientist floats a new theory, his
fellows test it before approving it. Rakove himself notes that a historical
approach "requires us to assess the probative value of any piece of evidence."" s
That Rakove swallowed Powell whole without such assessment testifies to the
mindset of a partisan. Nor has Powell, to my knowledge, ever attempted to
rehabilitate his citations. His "curious" usage was implicitly repudiated by the
House of Lords in Pepper v. Hart.' There, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, with whom
most of his brethren concurred, asked, why "should the courts blind themselves
to a clear indication of what Parliament intended in using those words"; and
answered, "we are much more likely to find the intention of Parliament [in its
debates] than anywhere else."67
In the second of his "powerful criticisms" of originalism, Rakove questions the
"capacity of originalist forays to yield the definitive conclusions that the
advocates of this theory claim to find."" He would not rely on "snatches of
debate" from the Convention but opts rather for a "more complicated inquiry,"69
for he believes that we cannot "convert expressions of individual opinion on
particular provisions into collective understandings."7  A "collective
understanding" is best manifested by a vote. But Rakove himself does not weave
his tale out of such votes but from a stream of "individual opinions" which
illuminate them. Then too, when a number of "individual opinions" concur while
the listeners are silent it may, be assumed that the individuals speak for them. In
every assembly a few speakers take the lead. In a considerable number of cases
the votes recorded in the Journal of the Convention confirm such concurrences.
Rakove's logic posits that no evidence is preferable to such concurrences,
thereby favoring unbridled judicial discretion.
According to Rakove, originalism asks how the language "would have been
understood at the time" of its adoption.7 As an originalist since 1942,7" I
disclaim any reliance on prophecy or mind-reading. Originalists do not speculate
about how the Founders "would have" construed their handiwork; we rely rather
on what they actually understood, on their accompanying explanations of what
their words mean and are intended to accomplish. Once uttered, such statements
have a life of their own, independent of what the draftsmen "would have
understood." For Willard Hurst, the terms to which the Framers attached clear
meaning were no more alterable than the common law words of established
65. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 12. "[Honest verification... is the very essence of science
." SULLIVAN, supra note 12, at 164.
66. 1993 App. Cas. 593 (H.L. 1992).
67. Id. at 635.
68. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at xv.
69. Id. at xiv.
70. Id. at 134.
71. Id. at 340 (emphasis added) (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTNG OF AMERICA
144 (1990)).
72. See Berger, supra note 11.
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meaning. 3 Common sense dictates no less. Why should common law practice,
external to a particular case, weigh more heavily than the writer's explanation of
what his words mean? A few examples should suffice to show that originalism
can yield "definitive conclusions" and disclose what the Framers actually meant.
(1) By Article II § 2 of the Constitution, the President "shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties." Over the years
the Executive has maintained that Senate participation is limited to consent to a
completed treaty. The records show, however, that the Senate was to participate
in making the treaty. As late as August 6, the Committee on Detail draft provided
that "the Senate... shall have the power to make treaties." During the debate
Madison observed that "the President should [also] be an agent in Treaties."'75
Hamilton explained in The Federalist No. 75 that "the joint possession of...
power ... by the president.and the senate would afford a greater prospect of
security, than the separate possession of it by either of them. 76 In the New York
Ratification Convention, Hamilton stated that the Senate, "together with the
President, are to manage all our concerns with foreign nations."7 In
Pennsylvania, James Wilson said, "nor is there any doubt but the Senate and
President possess the power of making [treaties]." 8 There were no contrary
expressions. Is no evidence to be preferred so that Rakove may "revel in... the
ambiguities of the evidentiary record"?79
73. Willard Hurst, The Process of Constitutional Construction, in SUPREME COURT AND
SUPREME LAW 55, 57 (Edmund Cahn, ed., 1954).
74. 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 183.
75. Id. at 392.
76. THE FEDERALISTNO. 75, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
77. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA
IN 1787, at 306 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1941 reproduction of 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES
ON ADOPTION].
78. Id at 506. Rakove notes that "Madison and other framers 'certainly knew what they.
intended' at Philadelphia when they defended the treaty power in the state conventions."
RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 359 (quoting 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 63, at 523). But
he argues that in the debate on the Jay Treaty, "they had never answered objections to the treaty
clause with [Madison's] theory." Id An omission in a partisan political struggle to cite one or
another theory does not alter the facts.
Hamilton's spokesman [William Smith] "appeal[ed] to the general sense of the
whole Nation at the time the Constitution was formed," noting that through these
"contemporaneous expositions," formed "when the subject was viewed only in
relation to the abstract power, and not to a particular [intensely unpopular] Treaty,
we should come at the truth."
Id. (quoting 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 63, at 495). Rakove would dispose of such
statements because they were motivated by considerations of partisan advantage. He does not,
however, disqualify partisan advantage when it favors his position. Would he maintain that
President Washington's appeal to the Journal of the Convention-to show that the House was
not included in the treaty-making process-was equally "heated•.., by faction"? Id at 349.
79. Id. at 9. Thus, Rakove adverts to a "deeper conceptual ambiguity about the nature of
statehood itself. What, after all, was a state," id at 166, a question which the Founders did not
pause to ask. The thirteen colonies had existed as entities with more or less defined territorial
boundaries and with instrumentalities of government, for example, assemblies. As Rakove
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(2) The evidence for the legitimacy of judicial review is even more
voluminous. In 1914 Edward Corwin summed up: "That the members of the
Convention of 1787 thought the Constitution secured to courts in the United
States the right to pass on the validity of acts of Congress under it cannot be
reasonably doubted."8 After enumerating those who contemplated judicial
review, Corwin stated:
True these are only seventeen names out of a possible fifty-five, but let it be
considered whose names they are. They designate fully three-fourths of the
leaders of the Convention.... On no other feature of the Constitution with
reference to which there has been any considerable debate is the view of the
Convention itself better attested.8
Similar views were expressed in the ratification conventions. In Virginia,
Marshall declared that if Congress "were to make a law not warranted by any of
the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement
of the Constitution which they are to guard.... They would declare it void."82
Marshall was joined by his Virginia colleagues, George Nicholas,83 George
Mason,84 Edmund Randolph, 5 James Madison,86 and even Patrick Henry.87
Similar views were expressed by Oliver Ellsworth in Connecticut88 and James
Wilson in Pennsylvania.89 Now the Constitution does not explicitly provide for
judicial review. Are we better off regarding it as a naked arrogation rather than
as within the Framers' contemplation?
(3) The Convention records show unmistakably that it rejected a proposal to
empower Congress to grant charters of incorporation. As Rakove points out,
Madison's "motion at the Convention to grant Congress a power of incorporation
obviously presumed that such authority did not yet exist elsewhere in the
Constitution (a position that Wilson, no strict constructionist, seems to
endorse)."9 Incorporation of a bank had been wrapped in controversy in
Pennsylvania and New York, and it was feared that such a proposal would excite
prejudice and possibly defeat adoption of the Constitution. Even when reduced
to corporations to build canals, the proposal was defeated by a vote of eight to
himself said, "A new condition demanded a new name." Id. The colonies had functioned as
societies and continued to do so without a hitch. James Bryce observed that "the Americans
had no theory of the state, and felt no need for one, being content, like the English, to base their
constitutional ideas upon law and history." JAMES BRYcE, THE AMERICAN CoMMoNwEALTH
1210 (Liberty Classics ed. 1995) (1888). To fall into a brown study about the nature of
statehood under the circumstances is to engage in pretentious punditry.
80. EDWARD S. CORWiN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDIcIAL REVIEW 10 (Peter Smith 1963)
(1914).
81. Id. at 11-13; see also BERGER, supra note 48, at 47-119.
82. 3 DEBATES ON ADOPTION, supra note 77, at 553.
83.3 id. at 443.
84. 3 id. at 523.
85. 3 Id at 570.
86. 3 id. at 532.
87. 3 id at 540-41.
88.2 id at 196.
89. 2 id at 445-46.
90. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 355.
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three;9' this cannot be dismissed as a "mirage" or some fugitive remarks.
Subsequently Abraham Baldwin reminded Justice Wilson (both were present at
the debate) that the proposal "to erect corporations ... was, on debate, struck
out"; 92 "Wilson agreed to the fact." 93
(4) What does "commerce" mean,94 asks Rakove, and indicates that what is
called for is "an intense analysis of key words."9 " Apart from consulting
contemporary usage and dictionaries, such analysis can verge on crystal gazing.
Let me steer him instead to the original understanding which, after all, is the
subject of his book. References in the debates were almost exclusively concerned
with foreign commerce (the exchange of goods), as the few examples cited by
Rakove confirm.96 The sole reference to what we term "interstate" commerce was
prevention of exactions by one state from another for the right of passage. Thus,
Madison states, "it would be unjust to the States whose produce was exported by
their neighbors, to leave it subject to be taxed by the latter."'97 Wilson "dwelt on
the injustice and impolicy of leaving N. Jersey, Connecticut &c any longer
subject to the exactions of their commercial neighbors." 9' Madison reiterated that
"the best guard against ... [this abuse] was the right in the Genl. Government to
regulate trade between State and State." '99 Sherman stated that the "oppression of
the uncommercial States was guarded against by the power to regulate trade
between the States."'0 0 And Oliver Ellsworth said that the "power of regulating
trade between the States will protect them against each other.'' ° Jefferson
reflected the Founders' views when he stated in 1791 that "the power given to
Congress by the Constitution does not extend to the internal regulation of the
commerce of a state . . . which remains exclusively subject with its own
legislature; but to its external commerce only."'0 2 In his retirement, Madison
recalled that:
[A]mong the several States [the textual terms] ... grew out of the abuse of
the power by the importing States in taxing the non-importing, and was
intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the
91. 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 616. Rakove dismisses this history because "Madison did
not claim that this tidbit of history was conclusive in itself." RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 352. By
this logic original intention is not to be given effect unless the speaker paused to testify that it
should!
92. 3 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 375.
93. Id. at 376.
94. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 8.
95. Id. at 11.
96. See id. at 28, 40. "From the beginning, the foreign trade of the United States was near
the core of its foreign policy." Louis HENKiN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 69
(1972).
97. 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 306.
98. Id. at 307.
99. Id. at 588-89.
100. Id. at 308.
101. Id. at 359-60.
102. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank, in DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 158, 159 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963) (ellipsis in
Commager edition).
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States themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the positive purposes
of the General Government. °3
(5) Perhaps the most striking example of the definitive conclusions that
originalism has uncovered is offered by the Fourteenth Amendment, to which
Rakove gives the barest mention, although it has become a mini-constitution and
engenders the bulk of constitutional litigation. First, some background.
Powell observed that the people viewed the Jeffersonian "revolution of 1800"
as their "endorsement" of original intention.' In 1838, the Supreme Court
declared that the construction "must necessarily depend on the words of the
[C]onstitution; the meaning and intention of the convention which framed and
proposed it for adoption and ratification to the conventions ... in the several
states . . . to which the Court has always resorted in construing the
Constitution."'' 5 "By the outbreak of the Civil War," Powell states,
"intentionalism in the modem sense reigned supreme."'016
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were aware of this practice.
Senator Charles Sumner, who sought to give the widest reach to the Amendment,
said that if the meaning of the Constitution "in any place was open to doubt, or
if words are used which seemed to have no fixed signification [for example,
"equal protection,"] we cannot err if we turn to the framers; and their authority
increases in proportion to the evidence they have left on the question."'0 7 John
Farnsworth, who sat in the 1866 Congress, said of the Amendment in 1871, "Let
us see what was understood to be its meaning at the time of its adoption by
Congress."'08 James Garfield, a fellow framer, likewise rejected an interpretation
that went "far beyond the intent and meaning of those who ... amended the
Constitution."'0 9 A unanimous Senate Judiciary Committee Report, signed in
1872 by Senators who had voted for the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments, declared that:
In construing the Constitution we are compelled to give it such an
interpretation as will secure the result which was intended to be accomplished
by those who framed it and the people who adopted it ....
A construction which should give [a] phrase.., a meaning differing from the
sense in which it was understood and employed by the people when they
103. Letter from Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 RECORDS, supra note 7, at
478.
104. Powell, supra note 43, at 934. In his Inaugural Address, President Jefferson pledged
to administer the Constitution "according to the safe and honest meaning contemplated by the
plain understanding of the people at the time of its adoption-a meaning to be found in the
explanations of those who advocated... it." 4 DEBATES ON ADOPTION, supra note 77, at 446
(emphasis omitted).
105. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838); see also Carpenter
v. Pennsylvania, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 456, 463 (1854).
106. Powell, supra note 43, at 947.
107. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866).
108. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1871), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 506 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) [hereinafter DEBATES ON
RECONSTRUCTION].
109. Id. at 152, reprinted in DEBATES ON RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 108, at 528.
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adopted the Constitution, would be as unconstitutional as a departure from
the plain and express language of the Constitution in any other particular.
This is the rule of interpretation adopted by all the commentators on the
Constitution, and in all judicial expositions of that instrument .... 10
Clearly the Reconstruction framers meant their explanations to govern.
Rakove would be hard put to maintain that evidence with respect to suffrage
and segregation is too indefinite to ascertain. Justice Harlan considered that the
one man-one vote doctrine flew "in the face of irrefutable and still unanswered
,history to the contrary."' Let two confirmatory items suffice. Senator Jacob
Howard, to whom it fell to explain the Amendment, stated: "We know very well
that the States retain the power ... of regulating the right of suffrage in the
States. . . . [T]he theory of this whole amendment is, to leave the power'of
regulating the suffrage with the people or Legislatures of the States, and not to
assume to regulate it.. . ."' ' The unanimous Report of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction doubted that "the States would consent to surrender a power they
had always exercised," and therefore thought it best "to leave the whole question
with the people of each State."". Were there any doubt, it would be dispelled by
the Fifteenth Amendment, designed to fill the "gap.""' 4 Rakove might well
ponder Justice Harlan's stern reproof: "When the Court disregards the express
intent and understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political
process to which the amending power was committed, and it has violated the
constitutional structure which it is its highest duty to protect.""'
As regards segregation, Michael McConnell has documented the prevalence
of segregated schools in the North, and the last ditch resistance to abolition of
the practice." 6 Congress had permitted segregated schools in the District of
Columbia," 7 over which it had plenary jurisdiction; Senator Sumner vainly
I 10. S. REP. No. 21, at 2 (1872), reprinted in DEBATES ON RECONSTRUCTION, supra note
108, at 571. Writing in 1939, tenBroek said that the Court "has insisted with almost
uninterrupted regularity, that the end and object of constitutional construction is the discovery
of the intention of those persons who formulated the instrument." Jacobus tenBroek, Use by
the Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction: The Intent Theory of
Constitutional Construction, 27 CAL. L. REv. 399, 399 (1939).
111. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). The one
man-one vote rulings rest "on the view that the courts are authorized to step in when injustices
exist and other institutions fail to act. This is a dangerous-and I think
illegitimate-prescription for judicial action." Gerald Gunther, Some Reflections on the
Judicial Role: Distinctions, Roots and Prospects, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 817, 825.
112. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3039 (1866), reprinted in DEBATES ON
RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 108, at 237.
113. S. REP. No. 112, at 8 (1866), reprinted in DEBATES ON RECONSTRUCTION, supra note
108, at 94.
114. Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U. L. REV.
311,321-23 (1979).
115. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
116. Michael McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decision, 81 VA. L. REV. 947
(1995).
117. 2 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 646 (1976).
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fought "to abolish segregated Negro schools in the District.""' A Congress
which refused to abolish segregation in the District of Columbia was altogether
unlikely to compel the States to outlaw it. That was confirmed by the assurance
of James Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 did not require that all children "shall attend the same
schools."".9 As late as 1875 the Civil Rights Act lowered the bar to segregation
on railroads and in theaters, but Congress refused to ban segregated schools.'20
My demonstration in 1977 that segregation was left untouched by the
Amendment met with all but universal condemnation; Paul Brest labeled me a
racist. With the passage of time, however, some twenty to thirty commentators,
including Ronald Dworkin, Richard Posner, and Lawrence Tribe, concur in-my
conclusion.'
2
'
FEDERALISM
Whether the States preceded the Union, Rakove asserts, "offered an enticing
avenue of escape" from the "task of disentangling the nuances of federalism,"'
22
thus tarring the opposition with escapism and transforming the central
constitutional fact into another opportunity to "revel in... ambiguit[y]."'" The
Federalists, however, preferred "to rest their [case] ... on simpler grounds."'24
Rakove acknowledges that the "states clearly preceded the Union in point of
time," that they were the "natural successors to the thirteen colonies." 25 But he
beclouds the issue: "If the persistence of the states was a given, their status was
not," because "fractious pressures" left their "authority and autonomy vulnerable
to attack."' 26 That something might affect a State in the future in no wise affects
its status as an independent State at the adoption. So much for "nuance."
118. Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered The Segregation Question,
54 MICH. L. REv. 1049, 1085 (1956).
119. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866), reprinted in DEBATES ON
RECONsTRUCTION, supra note 108, at 163.
120. See generally McConnell, supra note 116.
121. Id. at 952.
122. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 163.
123. Id. at9.
124. Id. at 188.
125. Id. at 163 (emphasis added). Earlier, Rakove had considered that the States were "'a
creation of the Continental Congress which preceded them in time and brought them into
being."' JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS 173 n.* (1979) (quoting
Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union Reconsidered: A Historical Refutation of State
Sovereignty over Seabeds, 74 COLuM. L. REv. 1057, 1057 (1974)). Now, he confirms that:
"[tihe Confederation that Congress proposed in November 1777 was a compact among thirteen
autonomous states," RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 100, and that "[tihe existence of the [S]tates was
simply a given fact of American governance, and it confronted the framers at every stage of
their deliberations." Id. at 162. For detailed confirmation, see RAOuL BERGER, FEDERALISM:
THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 21-47 (1987).
126. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 168 (emphasis in original). Rakove proves himself an
"ingenious theorist" who, in Madison's words, would bestow on the Constitution an "abstract
view ... planned in his closet or in his imagination." Id.
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Rakove affirms that for Wilson "the states and nation emerged
simultaneously," that Wilson was "the better historian ... for his understanding
of the concurrent origin of the Union and the States."' 27 Not alone is this
contradicted by his own admission, 28 but it falls afoul of the massive historical
facts to the contrary. 2 9 More than the temporal priority was at stake; this was not
a school boy race to be first to reach the goal. The incontrovertible prior
existence of the States enabled them to preserve their authority, to call a national
union- into being (for example, "the Continental Congress had to be created de
novo"), 3 to limit the jurisdiction they surrendered for national purposes, and to
retain the vast jurisdiction they did not delegate.'' As Herbert Wechsler
observed, "[f]ederalism was the means and price of formation of the Union...
. [The Founders] preserved the states as separate sources of authority and organs
of administration-a point on which they hardly had a choice."' 32
Rakove trivializes the work of the Convention by viewing it as "a process of
bargaining and compromise" rather than an "advanced seminar in constitutional
theory."'3 Compromise of conflicting interests is the genius of democratic
government. What captured the admiration of the world was the means whereby
they were resolved. But "[t]he Constitution is more than a mere bundle of
compromises. It is a document that articulates a theory of politics under which
the governed have consented to live."'34 The Convention affords a glimpse of
theory in the making, and the product richly justifies Madison's boast that the
Constitution marked an advance in the science of politics.
Historians, Rakove tells us, search for "underlying beliefs." "' One such, which
he recognizes, was the American "localist bias."' 36 For "most Americans indeed
127. Id. at 163; cf supra note 125.
128. See supra text accompanying note 125.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 146-58.
130. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 163.
131. Chief Justice Marshall alluded to "that immense mass of legislation... not surrendered
to the general government." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824).
132. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543
(1954). Wechsler echoed Walter Bagehot: Americans "altogether retained what... they could
not help, the sovereignty of the separate States .... Doubtless the framers of the Constitution
had no choice in the matter." NORMAN ST. JOHN STEVAS, WALTER BAGEHOT 358-59 (1950).
Today, States' rights are in ill repute, but Henry Adams concluded, "The doctrine of states'
rights was in itself a sound and true doctrine; as a starting point of American history and
constitutional law there is no other which will bear a moment's examination ... ." HENRY
ADAMS, JOHN RANDOLPH 273 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1882). Writing to General
Robert E. Lee after the Civil War, Lord Acton described the preservation of the States as "the
redemption of democracy." ROBERT SPEAIGHT, THE LIFE OF HILAIRE BELLOC 132 (1957).
133. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 15.
134. GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 13 (1985).
135. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 95.
136. Id. at 302. Madison wrote in 1788 that "'a spirit of locality' permeated American
politics." WOOD, supra note 47, at 195. Bagehot observed, "[a]t the beginning of every league
the separate States are the old governments which attract and keep the love and loyalty of the
people; the Federal Government is a useful thing, but new and unattractive." STEVAS, supra
note 132, at 359. Seeking to account for Southern sentiment during the Civil War, Nathaniel
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national politics mattered little"; they "directed their concerns towards local and
state issues."' 37 The vast distances that separated the inhabitants played no small
part in fostering their attachment to their own States. When William Houston was
sent from Georgia to the Continental Congress in 1785, he "thought of himself
as leaving his 'country' to go to 'a strange land amongst Strangers.""'13 Madison,
who had adventured from Virginia to Princeton, New Jersey, said, "[o]f the
affairs of Georgia I know as little as those of Kamskatska."' 39 Distance and
parochialism bred suspicion. Pierce Butler asked at the Convention, "Will a man
throw afloat his property & confide it to a govt. a thousand miles distant?"' 4 In
South Carolina, James Lincoln declaimed that adoption of the Constitution meant
a surrender of self-government to "a set of men who live one thousand miles
distant from you.'' 14' Local government in the colonies and their successor States
was the familiar; the new system was distrusted "because it would [remain]
remote and not so immediately subject to control." '42 Local government, it was
felt, would be more controllable by the people than the federal government,
because "it could be kept under closer observation.' 43 Small wonder that
Washington wrote midway through the Convention that "independent sovereignty
is so ardently contended for.., the local views of each State... will not yield
to a more enlarged scale of politicks.""'
This was evinced from the beginning. On July 2, 1776, Richard Henry Lee
proferred a resolution in the Continental Congress, "That these United Colonies
are . . . free and independent States . . . . That a plan of confederation be
prepared and transmitted to the respective Colonies for their consideration and
approbation."'' 4' Lee's Resolution was followed by the Declaration of
Independence. Jefferson's original title, "A Declaration by the Representatives
of the United States of America, in General Congress Assembled," was changed
by the Congress to "The Unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States,"
and the signatories subscribed separately on behalf of the individual States.'46 On
November 15, 1777, the Congress recommended the Articles of Confederation
to the States. Reciting that the members acted as the "delegates of the States
Hawthorne wrote, "We inevitably limit to our own State ... that sentiment of physical love for
the soil.. . ." Nathaniel Hawthorne, Henry James, in THE SHOCK OF RECOGNITION 427, 561
(Edmund Wilson ed., 1943).
137. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 28-29.
138. CARL VAN DOREN, THE GREAT REHEARSAL: THE STORY OF THE MAKING AND
RATIFYING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 45 (1948).
139. Id. at 15.
140. 1 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 173.
141. 4 DEBATES ON ADOPTION, supra note 77, at 313.
142. BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, CONSENSUS AND CONTINUITY, 1776-1787, at 55 (1958).
143. Cecelia M. Kenyon, Introduction to THE ANTIFEDERALISTS at lxxxvi (Cecelia M.
Kenyon ed., 1966).
144. 3 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 51.
145. Resolution for Independence, in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 100, 100 (Henry
Steele Commager ed., 6th ed. 1958) (emphasis added) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS].
146. SAUL K. PADOVER, JEFFERSON 61 (1942); see also THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE, reprinted in DOCUMENTs, supra note 145, at 100, 102.
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affixed to our Names,"'47 it provided by Article I that "Each State retains its
sovereignty, freedom and independence"'48 except as expressly delegated to the
United States. Article III provided that "The said States hereby severally enter
a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defence" :149 a
league, not a nation. The draftsmen recited that they acted "in the name and in
behalf of our respective constituents," not of the collective people of the whole
country; and they signed the "part & behalf of the State of New Hampshire," and
in like fashion for each of the other twelve States.' Similar expressions are
exhibited in the Treaty of Peace, September 3, 1783 with Great Britain.'
At the Convention, Gunning Bedford stated, "[t]hat all the States at present are
equally sovereign and independent, has been asserted from every quarter of this
House."' 52 Elsewhere I have collected compendious documentation to the same
effect."' It remains to note that the Constitution itself was signed by the
delegates on behalf of the individual States; Madison underscored in The
Federalist No. 39 that "ratification is to be given by the people, not as
individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and
independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and
ratification of the several States . ,, ." This bespeaks a compact, 55 and
whatever the effect of force majeure at Appomattox, it could not erase the
antecedent facts. 5 6 In sum, as Rakove recognizes:
147. THE ARTICLEs OF CONFEDERATION, reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 145, at I11.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 115-16.
151. By Article I, Britain "acknowledged the said United States, viz. New Hampshire,
Massachusetts," and so down the roster, to be "sovereign and independent States," and
provided by Article V that British subjects could freely go to "any of the thirteen United
States." Treaty of Peace with Great Britain (Sept. 3, 1783), reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra
note 145, at 117, 119.
152. 1 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 500.
153. BERGER, supra note 125, at 27-30.
154. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 254 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
155. "Compact" imagery "dominated American thinking." RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 320.
Early in the Convention Madison said:
[A]s far as the articles of Union [Constitution] were to be considered a Treaty
only of a particular sort, among the Governments of Independent States, the
doctrine might be set up that a breach of any one article, by any of the parties,
absolved the other parties from the whole obligation. For these reasons. . . it is
indispensable that the New Constitution should be ratified in the most
unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people themselves.
1 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 122-23.
156. The past, Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "cannot be recalled by the most absolute
power." Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810); see also Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
Rakove writes in a footnote: "[T]heorists argued that the states that had been the parties to
the original compact retained a sovereign right to reverse their decision." Rakove asserts,
"Amazingly enough, vestiges of that debate are still heard today. See Raoul Berger, Federalism:
The Founders' Design (1987)." RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 372 n.12. Nowhere have I ever
defended secession. To demonstrate the irrefutable fact that there was a compact is to be true
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The existence of the states was simply a given fact of American governance,
and it confronted the framers at every stage of their deliberations.... [T]he
framers [that is, some Federalists,] had to accommodate ... the stubborn
realities of law, politics, and history that worked to preserve the residual
authority of the states .... 11
Thereby Rakove's recognition renders meaningless his distinction between the
State's priority and its "status."
Rakove would resurrect the long-buried maxim imperium in imperio-there
cannot be two sovereigns ruling in a common territory. Madison disputed the
axiom, and maintained that "the people were in fact, the fountain of all power."
'158
Wilson declared that "the supreme power.., resides in the PEOPLE, as the
fountain of government."' 59 Elsewhere, Wilson wrote, "They can distribute one
portion to ... State governments [and] another proportion to the government of
the United States."' 6" Hamilton observed that the notion "[tihat two supreme
powers cannot act together, is false. They are inconsistent only when they are
aimed... at one indivisible object.'' "Echoing Wilson and Hamilton," Rakove
notes, Madison stated that "'t]he federal and State governments are in fact but
different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and
designed for different purposes.""" Rakove, however, concludes that Wilson
"used popular sovereignty to subvert the maxim of imperium in imperio."'' 63 This
is the nadir of activist respect for the will of the people: it must yield to a
maxim!
STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
It proved to be difficult, Rakove notes, to enlarge "the responsibilities of
national government much beyond those that the Continental Congress already
possessed."' 65 The Convention, he observes, was "concerned less with
to Ranke's injunction to tell it as it was. It is Rakove who would rewrite history to conform to
his predilictions.
157. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 162 (emphasis added). The conservatives were political
realists and had to compromise with the political reality of actual state sovereignty. See
MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 24 (1940).
158. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 105 (quoting 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 476).
159. PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-88, at 316 (John Bach
McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., The Historical Society of Pennsylvania 1888).
160. Id. at 302. The maxim that "all Government originates from the people" was "widely
accepted by almost every one." WOOD, supra note 47, at 330.
161. 2 DEBATES ON ADOPTION, supra note 77, at 355-56; see also RAKOVE, supra note 4,
at 190.
162. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 200 (quoting THE FEDERALIsTNO. 10, at 61 (James Madison)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
163. Id. at 190.
164. As further evidence of Rakove's flawed judgment, consider an incident he recounts. A
fellow political scientist had written flatteringly to him and "earns [his] profound thanks for
this sentence: 'If according to Madison, Tocqueville, Rakove . . . ."' Id. at 277 n.99. In
publishing his "profound thanks" he intimates that ranking him with Madison is his just due.
165. Id. at 178.
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broadening the objects of national government than with guaranteeing that it
would possess the powers necessary to secure its ends,"' 166 for example, the
execution of existing powers. As a result, Rakove comments, "the new Union
was only marginally less of a confederation than the one [under the Articles of
Confederation] it had replaced."' 67 Let us now consider the two spheres of
authority that emerged.
The Committee of Detail's report to the Convention embraced "little more than
matters of foreign relations and general commerce [and] most framers agreed.
. that national lawmaking would remain modest. 1 6 At the Convention, Rufus
King observed that "[t]he most numerous objects of legislation belong to the
States. Those of the Natl. Legislature were but few."' 69 As Wilson later observed,
"War, Commerce & Revenue were the great objects of the Genl. Government."' 170
Roughly speaking, the federal domain was external (foreign affairs), that of the
States internal (domestic affairs). Some have complained of the absence of "neat
boundaries,'' but that, Justice Holmes labeled "the tyro's question: Where are
you going to draw the line?-as if all life were not the marking of grades
between black and white,"' 72 even though, as Marshall earlier underscored, the
intervening imperceptible shades of gray "perplex the understanding."' 73 The
distinction between foreign and domestic affairs, between growing wheat and
importing it, is not nearly as perplexing. Wilson's test is eminently practical:
"Whenever an object occurs, to the direction of which no state is competent, the
management of it must, of necessity, belong to the United States .... , Thus
wild geese, here today and gone tomorrow, are in no State's jurisdiction, so it
falls to the federal government to regulate their migration.
Specifically,. Roger Sherman stated in the Convention, "The objects of the
Union ... were few: 1. Defense agst. foreign danger. 2. agst. internal disputes
& a resort to force. 3. Treaties with foreign nations[.] 4[.] regulating foreign
commerce, & drawing revenue from it ...- All other matters ... would be much
better in the hands of the States." 171 Variations on this theme are scattered
through The Federalist. The federal jurisdiction, said Madison in No. 39,
"extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.' 76 In No. 45 he
amplified: the federal powers "will be exercised principally on external objects,
as war, peace, negociation and foreign commerce .... The powers reserved to
166. Id. at 179.
167. Id. at 177.
168. Id. at 179.
169. Id. (quoting 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 198).
170. Id. (quoting 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 275).
171. Martin Shapiro, American Federalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA
359, 360,367 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1980); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS
DEBATE: ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 50 (1964).
172. 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETERS 331 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
173. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441 (1827).
174. MASON, supra note 171, at 12 (quoting I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 565 (James
DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896)).
175. 1 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 133.
176. THE FEDERALISTNO. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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the several states will extend to all the objects, which... concern the... internal
order... of the State."'177 Hamilton put it succinctly: the Constitution "is merely
intended to regulate the general political interests of the nation," not to regulate
"every species of personal and private concerns."'17 In No. 32 Hamilton stated
that "the State Governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty
which they before had and which were not by [the Constitution] exclusively
delegated to the United States."'179 In the upshot, the Framers left "the powers of
state government largely intact."'80
It cannot be unduly emphasized that, as Madison stated in No. 39, the States
are "no more subject within their respective spheres to the general authority, than
the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere."'' And Hamilton
explained in the New York Ratification convention that "[tihe laws of the United
States are supreme, as to all their... constitutional objects: the laws of the States
are supreme in the same way."' 82 Note Hamilton's words in No. 33: the
Constitution "expressly confines this [federal] supremacy to laws made pursuant
to the Constitution."'8 All this was aptly summarized by James Bryce: "The
federal government clearly was sovereign only for certain purposes, i.e., only so
far as it had received specific powers from the Constitution. These powers did
not, and in a strict legal construction do not now, abrogate the supremacy of the
states [in their reserved sphere]."' 4
Madison considered that "[t]he end of constitutional interpretation was ... to
preserve the equilibrium among institutions that the Constitution intended to
establish."'8 s And he emphasized that "[i]t is of great importance, as well of
indispensable obligation, that the constitutional boundary between [the Union
and the States] should be impartially maintained."'8 6 One of Rakove's egregious
oversights is the disastrous effect that the Court, which he would further
aggrandize, has had on federalism. "Throughout our history," wrote Philip
Kurland, "the Supreme Court has consistently acted as a centripetal force
favoring, at almost every chance, the national authority over that of the states. It
made substantial contributions to the ultimate demise of federalism."'8 7 Every
177. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also
MERRILL PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEw NATION 627 (1970): "The true theory
of our Constitution is ... that the states are independent as to everything within themselves,
and united as to everything respecting foreign nations."
178. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 579 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
179. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(emphasis omitted).
180. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 317.
181. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
182. 2 DEBATES ON ADOPTION, supra note 77, at 356.
183. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 207 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(emphasis omitted).
184. BRYCE, supra note 79, at 375.
185. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 345 (emphasis added); see also BRYCE, supra note 79, at
1496.
186. Letter from James Madison to Judge Roane (May 6, 1821), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 217 (New York, R. Worthington 1884) (1865).
187. PHILIP B. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTON 156-57 (1978).
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extension of federal jurisdiction correspondingly diminishes that of the States.
Richard Posner wrote: "apply the Bill of Rights to the states... and you weaken
the states tremendously by handing over control of large areas of public policy
to... judges."'8 8 As with his quest for "equality," cost what it may, so one may
conjecture that Rakove welcomes the judicial incorporation of the Bill of Rights
in the Fourteenth Amendment.'89 Alpheus Mason, however, noted that Justice
Brandeis "foreshadowed sharp differences of later years with the New Dealers
whose headlong drive for national power threaten[s] ... to destroy the greatest
bulwark of liberty-federalism."' 9
RATIFIERS AND FRAMERS
To deflate reliance on the Framers, Rakove trots out Madison's statement
during the Jay Treaty debate: "As the instrument came from [the Framers] it was
... nothing but a dead letter; until life and validity were breathed into it" by the
Ratifiers.' 9' Foreign affairs had become "the chief source of partisan conflict"
and the Jay Treaty aroused "a storm of protest."' 92 Opponents argued that the
Treaty required the approval of the House.'93 President Washington, however,
.cited the Journal of the Convention for its rejection of such participation,
confirmed in several Ratification conventions.'94 Madison himself discounted
remarks that were "heated or disturbed by faction."'9 " Strange indeed is Rakove's
citation, for his opus is largely composed of citations to the Framers, all but
inescapably, for most of the Constitution's provisions were not discussed by the
Ratifiers. 96 Rakove acknowledges that "[n]o author can stray far from a heavy
reliance on Madison's Notes of debates"; 97 that the "deliberations of the
Convention [are] the.., most salient set of sources for the original meaning of
the Constitution";'98 that "theirs were the only intentions that in any literal sense
affected the composition and substance of the Constitution"; '9 that they possess
"a unique authority that later interpretations can never equal";2" and that they
provide the "best historical evidence of what the Constitution meant to its
adopters and thus explaining why it was adopted ... [giving] the originating
188. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRIsis AND REFORM 195 (1985).
189. But see RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1989).
190. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 558 (1946).
191. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 17.
192. 1d. at 357.
193. Id "[B]y 1796 the politics of opposition had placed Madison in a position he had never
expected to occupy, [that is,] the powers of the House had.., to be extended." Id. at 364.
194. Id. at 360; see also 2 DEBATES ON ADOPTION, supra note 77, at 506; 3 DEBATES ON
ADOPTION, supra note 77, at 509.
195. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 349.
196. "Without [Madison's] notes of debates, it would be nearly impossible to frame more
than a bare bones account of how the Constitution took shape." Id. at 4.
197. Id. at 13.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 149.
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source its supreme authority, and therefore crucial to ascertaining legally binding
meanings for later interpreters."20 ' To shut our eyes to such crucial evidence
would be supreme folly. Of course, the Ratifiers were the more authoritative
spokesmen where their views differed from those of the Framers.
Actually Madison did not bar the door to the Framers' records; he considered
them "presumptive evidence of the general understanding at the time of the
language used";2 2 he said that the meaning of the Constitution would be found
"in the proceedings of the Convention, the contemporary expositions, and, above
all, in the ratifying conventions of the States."2 3 Madison, Mason, and Davie,
who were delegates to the Convention and to the Ratification conventions,
.explained some of the provisions to the Ratifiers.2' Earlier, I collected a number
of Madison citations to the Framers.2 5 Abraham Baldwin, Charles Pinckney,
Caleb Strong, and Pierce Butler, Framers all, referred to discussions in the
Convention.2" Rakove notes that "[i]ndividual framers were often asked [in the
Ratification conventions] why the Convention had acted in one way or had
declined to act in another," and he cites a number of such references.2 7 What
principal would feel barred from asking his agent to explain the provisions of a
document that he had been asked to prepare? Indeed, Rakove affirms that the
Framers' intentions "were the only intentions that in any literal sense, affected
the composition and substance of the Constitution. 20 8
MISCELLANEOUS RAKOVE VIEWS
The "real issue," Williard Hurst emphasized forty years ago, "is who makes the
policy choices ... judges or the combination of legislatures and electorate that
makes constitutional amendments."20 9 Rakove cautions, however, that "rigid,
adherence to the ideas of the framers.., would convert the Constitution into a
brittle shell incapable of adaptation to all the changes that distinguish the present
from the past."21' Not for him a "fixed" Constitution changeable only by
amendment; he protests against being "held captive to the extraordinary obstacles
of Article V.,,21' So he relies on "adaptation" by judges. Thus he chides us for
"rail[ing] against the evils of politically unaccountable judges enlarging
constitutional rights beyond the ideas and purposes of their original adopters, 2. 2
201. Id. at 149-50 (emphasis omitted).
202. LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTrruTION 17 (1988).
203. Id. at5.
204. For citations, see Raoul Berger, Original Intent andLeonard Levy, 42 RUTGERS L. REV.
255, 260 n.38 (1989).
205. Raoul Berger, Original Intent in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 296,
327-28 (1986).
206. For citations, see Berger, supra note 204, at 261 n.41.
207. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 16, 115, 155, 191, 319.
208. Id. at 13.
209. Willard Hurst, Discussion, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW, supra note 23, at
75.
210. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at xiii.
211. Id. at 368.
212. Id at 367-68.
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this in the name of bringing "rigor" to constitutional analysis."' Bluntly, he
would confide revision of the Constitution to judges. In halcyon days the
Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Constitution may be "amended by
judicial decision without action by the designated organs in the mode by which
alone amendments can be made." '2 14
Would-be "adaptors" have cited Marshall's "it is a constitution we are
expounding.., to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."2 5 But he
explained that his remark in McCulloch v. Maryland was merely addressed to a
proper means for execution of expressly granted powers, and flatly denied, again
and again, that his remark contained "the most distant allusion to any extension
by construction of the powers of congress, ' adding that the judiciary's power
cannot warrant "the assertion of a right to change that instrument."'21 7 The Court
never has explicitly laid claim to the revisionary power which current
academicians would press upon it. Justice Black, a redoubtable liberal, dismissed
"rhapsodical strains, about the duty of the Court to keep the Constitution in tune
with the times," ' emphasizing that the Framers provided for change by Article
V, whereby the people reserved unto themselves the power to change the
Constitution. Nevertheless, academicians halloo on the Court to ever more
"adaptation" to effectuate their social aspirations.2 9 I share those aspirations, but
my paramount allegiance is to the integrity of the Constitution. Justly does Judge
Frank Easterbrook ask, "[i]f the document no longer binds us in some respects,
why does it govern in others?"22 "Why," asked Marshall, "does a judge swear
to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution... if that constitution forms
no rule for his government?"22' Rakove's partiality for government by judiciary
should be considered in light of Paul Freund's observation: "It would be a
213. Id Rakove would bring to "constitutional interpretation a rigor it often lacks." Id at 11.
He stresses the "value of thinking rigorously." Id. at 8.
214. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892); see also Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422, 428 (1950).
215. Quoted by Chief Justice Hughes in Home Bldg. Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,
442-43 (1934) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819)
(emphasis in original)).
216. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 185 (Gerald Gunther ed.,
1969) (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 209.
218. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Gerald
Gunther rejected the view that courts are authorized to step in when injustice exists and other
institutions fail to act. Gunther, supra note 111. A power that cannot be delegated to another
branch cannot be assumed by it.
219. Thus Erwin Chemerinsky applauds the "constitutional changes wrought by the modem
Court," but deplores its many "wrong turns and missed opportunities." Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Unfulfilled Promise, 25 LoY. L.A.
L. REv. 1143, 1144 (1992); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Foreword: History, Fable and
Constitutional Interpretation, 25 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 1135, 1136 (1992).
220. Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction andAuthority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 368 (1992).
Madison stated in the Convention that "it would be a novel & dangerous doctrine that a
Legislature could change the constitution under which it held its existence." 2 RECORDS, supra
note 7, at 92-93.
221. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
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morally poor country indeed that was obliged to look to any group of nine wise
men for ultimate moral light and leading, much less a group limited to men drawn
from one profession, even that of law."'2 Platonic guardians were not for
Learned Hand.
FIXED CONSTITUTION
The logic for a fixed Constitution was cogently put by Philip Kurland:
The concept of the written constitution is that it defines the authority of
government and its limits, that government is the creature of the constitution
and cannot do what it does not authorize .... A priori, such a constitution
could have only a fixed and unchanging meaning, if it were to fulfill its
function. For changed conditions, the instrument itself made provision for
amendment which, in accordance with the concept of a written constitution,
was expected to be the only form of change.'m
Ours, Marshall declared, is a government of limited powers; "that those limits
may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose
is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed
by those intended to be restrained?" 4 And he declared, "[iln framing an
instrument, which was intended to be perpetual, the presumption is strong, that
every important principle introduced into it is intended to be perpetual also."225
From this it follows, as Justice Story concluded, that the Constitution is "to have
a fixed, uniform, permanent construction[; it] should not be dependent upon the
passions of parties at particular times, but the same yesterday, to-day and
forever." 6 Adoption had been vigorously opposed by the Anti-Federalists, and
the Federalists prevailed on the basis of assurances that Anti-Federalist fears
222. PAULA. FREuND, ONLAwAND JUSTICE 35 (1968). Activist Arthur Miller considers that
the Justices have not been prepared "for the task of constitutional interpretation." Arthur S.
Miller, The Elusive Search for Values in Constitutional Interpretations, 6 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 487, 500 (1979). Few have "the broad-gauged approach and knowledge," Miller adds,
essential to "search for and identify the values that should be sought in constitutional
adjudication." Id. at 507.
223. KURLAND, supra note 187, at 7.
224. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176.
225. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213, 355 (1827).
226. 1 STORY, supra note 17, § 426; see also Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920);
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-49 (1905); 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONs WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER
OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 123-24 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927).
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were groundless. 27 To repudiate such representations, 8 said Justice Story, is to
perpetrate a fraud on the American people. 29
Rakove, however, levels a "powerful criticism" of originalism: it is
fundamentally "anti-democratic, in that it seeks to subordinate the judgment of
present generations to the wisdom of their distant (political) ancestors."" ° This
has the merit of novelty; hitherto proponents of judicial. review have uneasily
noted that it was undemocratic because it took momentous decisions from the
people and placed them in judges, who are unelected, unaccountable and
irremovable.23' "Present generations" are not barred from amending the
Constitution; judges are.
Our system of government is founded on "the consent of the governed."" The
terms of that consent are spelled out in the Constitution; the people, averred
James Iredell, one of the ablest Founders, "have chosen to be governed under
such and such principles. They have not chosen to be governed or promised to
submit upon any other." '233 Rakove would substitute that "other" without giving
the people an opportunity to determine whether they share his preference. Under
our system a law remains in effect until it is repealed. The judge (much less the
academician), wrote Learned Hand, "has no right to divination of public opinion
which run counter to its last formal expressions." 4 Every amendment to the
Constitution testifies that except as so altered, the people remain satisfied with
the Constitution. With Mark Tushnet, I prefer the view that "we are indeed better
227. "Anti-Federalist fears were part of the original understanding of the Constitution...
• [T]hey influenced the arguments that were made in its support .... RAKOVE, supra note 4,
at 17. For example, The Federalist No. 78 patently was designed to counter "Brutus's"
penetrating analysis of the judiciary Article. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
228. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 343, notes the "arguments most likely to influence the course
of ratification."
229. 2 STORY, supra note 17, § 1084. "If the Constitution was ratified under the belief,
sedulously propagated on all sides, that such protection was afforded, would it not now be a
fraud upon the whole people to give a different construction to its powers?" Id.
230. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at xv n.*.
231. Cass R. Sunstein, Earl Warren Is Dead, NEW REPUBLIC, May 13, 1996, at 35, 37.
Sunstein observes that the people have a "right to democratic government... and judicial use
of abstract moral principles may well intrude on [that] right." Id. Justice Frankfurter explained
that "[t]he reason why from the beginning even the narrow judicial authority to nullify
legislation had been viewed with ajealous eye in that it serves to prevent the full play of the
democratic process." West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 650 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For elaboration of this view, see Henry Steele Commager, Judicial
Review and Democracy, 19 VA. Q. REv. 417 (1943). With Leonard Levy, I agree that Eugene
Rostow has failed to meet Commager. See Leonard W. Levy, Judicial Review, History, and
Democracy: An Introduction, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 24 (Leonard W.
Levy ed., 1967); Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character ofJudicial Review, 66 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1952).
232. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in DOCUMENTS,
supra note 145, at 100.
233. 2 GRIFFITH J. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 146 (1857).
234. HAND, supra note 12, at 14.
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off being bound by the dead hand of the past than being subjected to the whims
of wilfull judges trying to make the Constitution live.""5
Judge Frank Easterbrook points out that "Constitutional interpretation... is
a process of holding actual government within certain bounds." '236 Hamilton
stated in The Federalist No. 78 that "[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the
courts, it is indispensable that they be bound down by strict rules which serve to
define and point out their duty in every particular case. ' This was designed to
allay the "profound fear" of judicial discretion. 8 Originalism was not a
scholastic exercise; it served as a brake on judicial revision of written
documents. If, wrote Earl Maltz, "intent is irrelevant and the text ambiguous,
courts are left with no constitutional source that defines the limits of their
authority."239 Richard Kay explained:
To implement real limits on government the judges must have reference to
standards which are external to, and prior to, the matter to be decided. This
is necessarily historical investigation. The content of those standards are [sic]
set at their creation. Recourse to "the intention of the framers" in judicial
review, therefore, can be understood as indispensable to realizing the idea of
government limited by law.24
Very different is Rakove's explanation of why "appeals to the original meaning
of the Constitution ... still play a conspicuous role in our political and legal
discourse .... [T]he imperatives of law-office history.., promise some tangible
advantage." '24t This comes with ill grace from one who confesses that he "like[s]
originalist arguments when the weight of the evidence seems to support the
235. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787 (1983).
236. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Influence of Judicial Review on Constitutional Theory, in
A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT? THE CoNsTrrurION AFTER 200 YEARS, supra note 64, at 172.
237. THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
238. WOOD, supra note 47, at 298. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 305, notes the "traditional bias
against judges," and against "judicial discretion in interpreting the law."
239. Earl M. Maltz, Federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Comment on
"Democracy and Distrust", 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 209, 210 (1981). Lawrence Church, who is
unsympathetic to originalism, recognizes that if judges "are not bound by the intent of the
founders ... then there may be no limits at all to their power." W. Lawrence Church, History
and the Constitutional Role of the Courts, 1990 WiS. L. REV. 1071, 1087-88.
240. Richard S. Kay, Book Review, 10 CONN. L. REV. 801, 805-06 (1978) (reviewing
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977)) (footnotes omitted). Sunstein regards the
"impulse toward originalism in constitutional law... as a way of limiting judicial discretion
and increasing the potential effect of moral and political deliberation in democratic arenas."
Sunstein, supra note 23 1, at 37. I would add that judicial discretion is limited by age-old rules
of construction. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 510 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961); KENT, supra note 18; STORY, supra note 17, § 155 n.2. As a practical matter, resort
to original intention "avoids uncertainty and arbitrariness and promotes predictability and
consistent application." J.M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History,
63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 928-29 (1988) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE
FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)).
241. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 366.
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constitutional outcome I favor." '242 Our discourse is in the field of scholarship,
not of lawyers bent on winning cases.243 In that field, Paul Brest pleaded with his
fellow activists "simply to acknowledge that most of our writings [about judicial
review] are not political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs
ultimately designed to persuade the Court to adopt our various notions of the
public good," '244 of which Rakove's commitment to "equality" even at the cost of
Article V is an example. Scholars, Rakove piously intones, "can at least be
bounded... by the canons of scholarship.""24 A basic canon is fidelity to the
facts even when they run counter to our social aspirations. In the midst of the
heated debate about Darwinism, Thomas Huxley declared, "[m]y colleagues have
learned to respect nothing but evidence, and to believe that their highest duty lies
in submitting to it, however it may jar against their inclinations. 246
What is the alternative to originalism? Justice Scalia considers it a grave defect
of the nonoriginalists that they have been unable to agree upon an alternative
theory. "Surely," he observes, "there must be general agreement not only that
judges reject one exegetical approach (originalism), but that they adopt another
.... [I]t is hard to discern any emerging consensus as to what this might be."
247
That understates the discordance. Earl Maltz considers that "the premises from
which the various commentators proceed vary so widely that the achievement of
consensus is likely to be impossible. 243 Paul Brest, himself a nonoriginalist,
concluded that "no defensible criteria exist" whereby to assess "value-oriented
242. Id. at xv n.*. Rakove prefers "claims of equality" to compliance with Article V. Id. at
368. This is advocacy of a cause. Peter Gay, the eminent historian, observed that one who
approaches empirical data by way of a preconceived theoretical bias is a poor historian. See
HISTORIANS AT WORK (Peter Gay & Victor G. Wexler eds., 1975).
243. Alfred Kelly, a historian, not a lawyer, recorded that he was retained in the
desegregation case to file a historical brief for the NAACP. Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth
Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 1049 (1956). He:
manipulated history in the best tradition [?] of American advocacy, carefully
marshalling every possible scrap of evidence in favor of the desired interpretation
and just as carefully doctoring all the evidence to the contrary, either by
suppressing it when that seemed plausible, or by distorting it when suppression
was not possible.
Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 116, 144. To
my mind, Kelly aptly described Rakove's own course.
244. Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981). Commenting on some
aspects of appeals to original intention during the Jay Treaty debate, RAKOVE, supra note 4,
at 365, asserts that they were dictated "by considerations of partisan advantage." Appeals to
the text of the Constitution may be open to the same objection.
245. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 21.
246. THOMAS H. HUXLEY, EVIDENCE AS TO MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE (1863), quoted in
HOMER W. SMITH, MAN AND His GODS 372 (1953). The historian has "a special obligation to
sobriety and fidelity to the record." C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY
87 (1960).
247. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 855 (1989).
248. Earl M. Maltz, Murder in the Cathedral-The Supreme Court as Moral Prophet, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 623, 623 (1983).
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constitutional adjudication." '249 According to Michael Perry, activists have not
come up with "a defensible nonoriginalist conception of constitutional text,
interpretation and judicial role."25 A dispassionate Canadian observer, Allan
Hutchinson, commented that "American scholars struggle to offer some
theoretically valid account of the jurisprudential enterprise .... [They are]
energized by a growing sense of desperation." '' Not an inkling of this state of
nonoriginalist theorizing appears in Rakove's sunny rhetorical sky.
In closing Rakove asks why we seek "to recover... original meanings," and
suggests two answers, the first of which is noted in the footnote below. ' Let me
consider the second: was the Framers' vision of popular government more
profound than our own? I would not rest originalism on the wisdom of the
Founders, though we could not muster their like today. Originalists consider, in
Rakove's words, that "the original meaning of the Constitution is binding
because it represents the highest exercise of popular sovereignty possible within
the constitutional system." 3 The people then consented to be governed under its
214terms, reserving unto themselves the power to change them. As Hamilton
stated in The Federalist No. 78: "Until the people have by some solemn and
authoritative act annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon
themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even
knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure
from it, prior to such an act.""s If the Constitution is alterable at the pleasure of
the legislature or the Court, then, as Chief Justice Marshall declared, "written
constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in
its own nature illimitable. 2 6
249. Brest, supra note 244, at 1065. In The Federalist No. 38, Madison admonished critics
that before discarding a proposed remedy they ought "at least agree among themselves on some
other remedy to be substituted." THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 243 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
If "the Supreme Court's purpose is to establish justice without reference to the original intent
of the framers, then what remains to circumscribe judicial power? Berger's critics have given
singularly unsatisfactory answers to this question." Donald P. Kommers, Role of the Supreme
Court, 1978 REV. POL. 409, 413 (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
(1977)).
250. Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition and Reason: A Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 602 (1985).
251. Allan C. Hutchinson, Alien Thoughts: A Comment on Constitutional Scholarship, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 701, 701 (1985).
252. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 368. Rakove suggests two possible reasons in the form of
questions. The first is, do "we truly believe that language can only mean now what it meant
then?" Id That the terms of the Constitution must have a fixed meaning has been shown supra
text accompanying notes 223-39. Jefferson regarded the "limits" of the Constitution as meant
to "Bind [our delegates] down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution." 4 DEBATES ON
ADOPTION, supra note 77, at 543. Rakove would transform those chains into ropes of sand with
the object of turning over our destiny to the judiciary.
253. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 340.
254. See supra text accompanying note 232.
255. THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 527-38 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
256. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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Rakove cannot bring himself squarely to challenge the "assumption," as did
Paul Brest, that judges are "bound by the text or original understanding of the
Constitution. 257 He overlooks what the Massachusetts House perceived in 1768,
that the government, which derives its authority from the Constitution, cannot
"overleap" its bounds "without subverting its own foundation.""25 More simply,
ifjudges are not bound by the Constitution, they cannot bind us.259 Hamilton, for
whom the constitutional scheme ran counter to his desire, yet referred in The
Federalist No. 25 to "that sacred reverence, which ought to be maintained in the
breasts of rulers towards the constitution. ' 26' The complaints of Rakove and his
ilk are not shared by the people. Even the frde-wheeling Paul Brest noted that for
the people, "the written Constitution lies at the core of the American 'civil
religion.' '26' The crowning answer to "why original meaning" is that of Madison,
meditating in his retirement:262 "if the sense in which the Constitution was
accepted and ratified by the Nation... be not the guide in expounding it, there
can be no security for a consistent and stable government, more than for a
faithful exercise of its powers. 263
Rakove, it is quite clear, approves "the result-oriented reasoning of
contemporary legal theory and its accompanying willingness to expand the
authority of federal courts at the expense of democratic autonomy of
communities and states.' 2"" Illustrative is his refusal to be held captive by the
amending procedure of Article V in his quest for claims of equality. Mine, to
257. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 224 (1980).
258. Letter of the Massachusetts House to Lord Camden, in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 65 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963). Madison stated in the Convention that
"[ijt would be a novel & dangerous doctrine that a Legislature could change the constitution
under which it held its existence." 2 RECORDS, supra note 7, at 92-93.
259. See supra text accompanying note 220.
260. THE FEDERALISTNO. 25, at 163 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
261. Brest, supra note 257, at 234 (footnote omitted). Justice, then Professor, Hans Linde,
wrote, "[tihis whole enterprise of constitutional law rests, after all, on the premise that the
nation cares about its Constitution, not about its courts." Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and
the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 256 (1972).
262. The weight to be attached to this distillation of his experience is attested by Justice
Story, a dedicated nationalist:
Venerable, as he now is, from age and character, and absolved from all those
political copnections which may influence the judgment and mislead the mind, he
speaks from his retirement in a voice which cannot be disregarded, when it
instructs us by its profound reasoning, or admonishes us of our dangers by its
searching appeals.
1 STORY, supra note 17, § 396.
263. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 186, at 441. To the voice of Madison may be added
that of Washington in his Farewell Address: "let there be no change by usurpation; for though
this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free
governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil
any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield." 35 THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 214, 229 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940) (citations omitted).
264. RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 5 (footnote omitted).
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borrow from him, has been "the historian's old-fashioned and perhaps naYve
desire to get the story right for its own sake." '265 When Rakove, for instance,
ignores the seven-hundred-year long Anglo-American resort to the original
intention, the story is skewed, not "right," a poor way to supply "rigor" to
constitutional interpretation.
Nearly twenty years ago, Max, now Lord, Beloff, an Oxford emeritus, wrote
in a review of my Government by Judiciary in the London Times, "The quite
extraordinary contortions that have gone into proving the contrary [nonoriginalist
view] make sad reading for those impressed by the high quality of American
legal-historical scholarship." '266 Rakove has added another sorry chapter to such
"scholarship."
265. Id. at 22.
266. Max Beloff, Arbiters of America's Destiny, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. SUPPLEMENT
(London), Apr. 7, 1978, at 11.
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